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of advocacy for a British rearmament
policy, and ideological opposition to
Nazism serves as a powerful contrast to
Chamberlain’s flawed use of Realpolitik.
Bew breaks less original ground in
the post-1945 period, as Realpolitik in
the postwar United States is decidedly
intertwined with the much-discussed
“realist” school of foreign policy
exemplified by academics such as Hans
Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz. The
term’s Germanic origins and use by
discredited proponents of the Second
and Third Reichs undoubtedly contributed to a period of limited use, even by
self-proclaimed realists. Bew’s narrative,
post-1945, begins to merge into the
broader discussion of the different
schools of American foreign policy that
emerged during the Cold War—an area
of much previous research without room
for the compelling scholarship offered
in this book’s early chapters. Like all
who study “realism,” Bew is drawn to an
extended meditation on Henry Kissinger
and his influence on U.S. foreign policy.
Refreshingly, Bew is cognizant of the
subtlety and nuance of Kissinger’s worldview and refuses to paint that enigmatic
figure with an overly broad brush.
Realpolitik: A History is an important
contribution to international relations
scholarship, not least for resurrecting
Ludwig von Rochau and the origins of
Realpolitik. Bew is to be credited with
tracing the term’s evolution in multiple
countries with different political cultures
with relative ease and skill, showing time
and again the slow metamorphosis of the
term into something far different from
what its creator intended. Particularly
in the interwar appeasement debate,
Realpolitik found itself misused toward
ends that were anything but realist. More
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broadly, the term has been twisted to
mean any policy that is believed to lack a
moral foundation or, from the contrary
viewpoint, is seen as grounded in realistic levelheadedness. As Bew’s narrative
ends and the term is gradually subsumed
into the broader tradition of American
realism, the reader is reminded of the
inherent flimsiness of the structure of
so many of the terms endemic to the
debate over American foreign policy.
Professor Bew’s new book is a helpful
antidote to such rhetorical laziness.
ALEXANDER B. GRAY

Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice, by William C. Martel. New York: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 2015. 548 pages. $115.

“The main goal of this book,” Martel
writes, “is to provide contemporary
policy makers and scholars with a
rigorous historic and analytic framework
for evaluating and conducting grand
strategy” (p. ix). Acknowledging that
the term itself is “relatively new,”
although its concepts certainly can
be found throughout history, Martel
credits academics during World
War II (particularly “the founder of
modern grand strategy, Edward Mead
Earle”) with being the first to focus
on a nation’s “highest political ends,”
employing all elements of national
power—“diplomatic, informational,
military, economic”—to achieve global,
long-term security goals (pp. 23, 25, 30).
He thus elevates grand strategy above
“strategy,” “operations,” “tactics,” and
“technology” while acknowledging that
for most of history “strategy”—how to
achieve overall military victory—was
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largely identical with “grand strategy”
when the other components of national
power were inconsequential. Thus,
until the twentieth century, the Royal
Navy—not English ambassadors nor
the East India Company nor the
inventors of steam power—dominated
Britannia’s grand strategy because it
determined Great Britain’s strategy, i.e.,
its means of winning important wars.

from Theodore Roosevelt through
Franklin D. Roosevelt. Since 1945, the
United States has opposed revolutionaries but supported democratic-leaning
reform. (Critics certainly would argue
specifics, pointing to instances of
American to-the-hilt backing of
undemocratic rule when specific
economic, political, or military priorities
submerged sensitivity to social justice.)

Martel’s theoretical presentation
explains strategic thinkers from Sun
Tzu, Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes,
and Locke through Jomini, Clausewitz,
Smith, Hamilton, and List. From the
sixteenth to the twentieth centuries,
Martel reviews Philip II, Frederick II,
Napoleon, Bismarck, and Metternich,
then examines the apogees and declines
of the British and Ottoman Empires.

The heart of Martel’s descriptive review
of American grand strategy and his
prescriptive conclusion on the future
of that strategy rest on three principles
that Martel argues always must be
balanced. The first is that the domestic
foundations of American economic,
military, diplomatic, and social power
have to be strong. (It is illuminating
to view two centuries of American
foreign policy from the internal
perspective of the influence of slavery,
territorial expansion, isolationism, and
economic development rather than the
usual wars, crises, and treaties. On the
other hand, when Martel’s “domestic
foundations” of national strength
extend to “education, health care, and
retirement systems,” questions about
prioritization naturally arise [p. 355].)

“Revolutionary” thinkers—Marx, Lenin,
Trotsky, Mao, Hitler, and Ho—are also
covered because of their impact on
the contemporary world. However,
“[w]ith the advent of thermonuclear
weapons, classic approaches to strategy
[for military victory] became largely
irrelevant, having lost any practical
meaning in the face of intolerable urban
destruction, if not the annihilation
of societies and humanity itself. This
development effectively shifted strategy
from its historical foundations of how to
win wars to how to avoid wars” (p. 121).
Turning in the second half of this
book to American history, Martel
asserts that the nation’s grand strategy
fundamentally has been that of neither a
“status-quo” state nor a “revolutionary”
one; it consistently has been that of a
“gradualist” state, always seeking change
but never rapid and radical change.
“Restraining Sources of Disorder” is the
chapter title for American foreign policy
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The second principle, of leading efforts
to restrain “sources of disorder that
present direct threats to U.S. vital
interests,” is complicated by Martel’s
assertion that “America needs to stand
for and defend principles that promote
human rights and dignity, equality for
all peoples—men and women—freedom
of expression, free enterprise, and fair
elections” (pp. 357–58). Thus, realist
attempts to distinguish American “vital
interests” from Wilsonian idealism are
rejected. But how then are extensive
economic relations with China or
Saudi Arabia to be weighed in light of
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blatant human rights violations if all are
“American vital interests”? Yes, it can be
done—but the argument is less clear.
Martel’s final principle is that the
nation must strengthen alliances
and partnerships to promote shared
responsibilities effectively to solve global
problems. Recognizing that American
power is limited, Martel counsels against
temptations toward either American
overreach or American withdrawal on
key global and regional problems.
Martel applies these principles to
“current” foreign policy issues to
illustrate their utility; the inevitable
drawback to such relevance is the danger
of “shelf life” interest, i.e., how long
will readers care about or even recall
foreign policy specifics from 2014?
Conversely, some topics that seem
important at the time of this writing
(e.g., violent Wahhabism, Russian
aggressiveness) receive little attention.
A weakness of generalized, historically
centered summaries of policy decisions
is the tendency to see, in retrospect,
clear choices and definite paths, but
to underestimate the uncertainty and
angst that decision makers suffered. By
contrast, specific case studies (e.g., the
Cuban missile crisis, Vietnam, the 2003
Iraq war, the 2008 economic crisis) always show the confusion and fear. Martel’s sweeping review gives surprisingly
little attention to the fact that nearly
all grand strategy decisions are made
while under risk or amid uncertainty by
those who are fraught with anxiety and
apprehension, and constitute gambles on
guesses rather than calm choices about
how best to balance good principles and
achieve optimal outcomes. Martel—who
certainly understood the policy-making
process—might have replied that the
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purpose of his final book was to advise
policy makers and scholars on how such
decisions should be made, rather than to
describe how they will feel while doing
so. But readers might have benefited
from at least an acknowledgment of
this apprehension, the way Bill Martel
used to offer a cheerful but sympathetic
smile to friends and students struggling
with problems he had posed to us.
The date of this book’s release—12
January 2015—was the day its author
died at the age of fifty-nine after a
yearlong battle with leukemia. Bill
Martel was for ten years a professor
of international security studies at the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
at Tufts University (where he received
the James L. Paddock award for teaching
excellence) and an adjunct electives
professor at the Naval War College.
Previously, he had taught in the College’s
National Security Decision Making
Department for half a dozen years,
following a similar period as founding
director of the Air Force’s Center for
Strategy and Technology at the Air War
College. He also had served as an adviser
to the National Security Council and the
Romney 2012 presidential campaign.
This reviewer was one of his many
colleagues and students who counted
themselves blessed by his friendship.
THOMAS GRASSEY

The Struggle for Sea Power: A Naval History of
the American Revolution, by Sam Willis. New
York: W. W. Norton, 2016. 608 pages. $35 (Kindle
$16.05).

Sam Willis describes (p. 5) the war for
American independence as “the most
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